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Introduction to Special Issue on the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War 
 
 
The sixtieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War is an ideal time to re-explore the 
history of this complex conflict. For, despite this major landmark, few people in the West 
have any real sense of when and why this ‘hot’ episode in the otherwise ‘Cold’ War came to 
pass. The same could almost have been said in academic circles until at least the conflict’s 
fortieth anniversary. Prior to the release in the 1970s and 1980s of previously classified 
documents and private papers in the United States, and many countries allied to it, for the 
pre-war years through to 1953, the orthodox interpretation of the Korean War closely 
followed President Harry S. Truman's description of the conflict at the time as an act of 
Soviet-inspired communist aggression that had to be met1. Furthermore, in the last two 
decades, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s emergence as a global Power, 
evidence has gradually been made available by both Beijing and Moscow. These sources 
have provided a much clearer picture of the motives and decision-making processes behind 
the Iron Curtain at the time. 
As a result, to describe the Korean War amongst scholars as either ‘forgotten’, 
‘unknown’ or even ‘the war before Vietnam’ is now an unwarranted cliché2. The significance 
of this short but intense conflagration in shaping the post-war world, not to mention the risks 
of a global conflict that it entailed especially in the  winter of 1950-1951, have long been 
appreciated by political, international, military, social and economic historians alike. While 
the Cold War clearly existed prior to 1950, the Korean War set in motion a chain of events 
that militarised and globalised this unconventional conflict and shaped international relations 
until 1989 and beyond. Consequently, in recent years a proliferation of research has been 
conducted into a wide array of aspects of this unique confrontation. What is more, sharp 
levels of disagreement persist between historians over a host of issues more than six decades 
after fighting broke out on the peninsula. 
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This brief introduction, however, will not attempt to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the existing literature on the Korean War. Many excellent pieces of work of this 
nature have already been written3. Instead, it will summarise the six very different chapters 
contained within this collection, outlining the main themes of each and providing some 
analysis of the insights of its author. It will then relate these contributions to the developing 
literature on the Korean War and the relevant current debates that are raging within the 
historiography. But first it is necessary to say something about this collection as a whole. Its 
aim is not to cover every aspect of the entire Korean War. It is, rather, to showcase the work 
currently being undertaken by a series of scholars, at different stages of their careers, from a 
range of perspectives. Still, these diverse essays share a number of commonalities and certain 
unifying themes permeate throughout.   
To begin with, each essay has a distinct geographical focus. William Stueck and 
Boram Yi focus on the United States and South Korea; Robert Barnes on the British 
Commonwealth; Zhihua Shen on the three Communist states involved: the USSR, China and 
North Korea; while the other contributors concentrate solely on the United States. Moreover, 
these chapters are united by the fact they each examine an understudied aspect of the conflict. 
Alliance diplomacy is one such example. While Stueck and Yi, and Barnes, are concerned 
with relations between the United States and its closest allies, Shen examines the fledgling 
coalition between Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang. The central them in Colin Jackson’s 
work is military policy and the difficult choices faced by the United Nations Command 
(U.N.C.) in the spring of 1951. Steven Casey, in turn, covers the U.S. domestic political 
dimension. Furthermore, memory is the essential element in Charles Young’s chapter as he 
asks why the Korean War remains ‘forgotten’ in the United States today.  
Finally, there is a roughly chronological thread running through this collection. 
Stueck and Yi concentrate on the years between 1945 and 1950. Shen looks at the first 
months of the war until Chinese intervention. Barnes takes up the story here examining the 
crisis that followed the arrival of Chinese forces. Jackson then looks at the emergence of the 
military stalemate in the spring of 1951. Casey’s chapter covers the war as a whole but does 
provide considerable detail regarding the middle years and Eisenhower’s election campaign 
in 1952. While Young looks at the final eighteen months of the conflict and its aftermath. 
                                                            
3
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This structure provides the book with much coherence, especially for readers less well versed 
in the events of the Korean War. 
 
 
As indicated above, the first chapter in this collection, written by William Stueck and Boram 
Yi, examines the slow and often difficult emergence of the U.S.-South Korean alliance 
before, during and after the Korean War. Stueck and Yi start by recounting the story of the 
controversial and hurried U.S. occupation of Korea south of the 38th parallel: the United 
States Army Military Government in Korea’s (USAMGIK) weak and inappropriate policies; 
General John Hodge’s refusal to talk to popular Leftist groups and his reliance initially on the 
existing Japanese apparatus and then on the conservative landed elite; Washington’s general 
lack of interest in Korea with more pressing Cold War priorities in Europe; the American 
military’s desire to terminate its commitment as quickly as possible; the creation of the 
Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) under UN auspices in 1948; and the withdrawal of American 
forces a year later. Yet Stueck and Yi, using new evidence from firsthand accounts, Korean 
language sources, and U.S. Army documents, provide an original insight into the strained 
interaction between the occupiers – American officials as well as ordinary soldiers – and the 
occupied Korean population. They suggest that at the start of 1950 Washington had little 
interest in building closer bonds with the R.O.K. 
Stueck and Yi stress that relations between the occupiers and occupied quickly soured 
due in large part to the policies adopted by the USAMGIK and existing socio-political 
divisions within the Korean populace. But they add to the existing literature by emphasising 
the role played by the disrespectful and often criminal behaviour of U.S. troops toward 
Koreans. They outline in detail American soldiers’ misperceptions of the Korean people as 
deceitful and treacherous and their belief that Koreans only respected the rule of force. In 
addition, they write of the common physical assaults inflicted upon ordinary Koreans and 
their lack of respect for Korean cultural norms, particularly when it came to approaching 
women. Stueck and Yi blame these problems on the general low level of education amongst 
the soldiers; the fact many found it difficult to shift from the dehumanising experience of 
fighting to occupation duties; the lack of morale created by the perceived material 
impoverishment of serving in Korea; the poor quality officers who failed to discipline their 
inferiors; and inherent racist attitudes magnified by the victory over Japan. For their part the 
Korean people felt that Americans at all levels treated them as a conquered nation and did not 
take into account their legitimate desires for independence and unification. 
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Stueck and Yi conclude by briefly examining U.S.-South Korean relations post-1948. 
They stress that Washington was very reluctant to commit militarily to Seoul partly due to 
greater Cold War priorities but also due to the poor relations that had developed during the 
occupation. The two historians claim that this half-hearted commitment encouraged the North 
Korean invasion in June 1950 and argue that the United States grudging intervention in the 
resulting conflict, ‘derived more from concern about its potential impact on the reputation of 
the United States worldwide than on sympathy for ROK leaders or the Korean people’. 
Nonetheless, they state that the Korean War had a deep psychological impact and was pivotal 
in forming a lasting alliance between the two countries that has withstood many upheavals in 
the international order. The ‘second US occupation’ and the sacrifice of American troops to 
protect the R.O.K. allowed Washington to assume the new ‘role of elder brother’ in the 
Korean Confucian mindset. The U.S. Government, for its part, treated the R.O.K. more 
seriously once its forces had proved their value and Seoul had become a major strategic Cold 
War partner. Even so, the authors note that contemporary U.S.-South Korean relations, while 
culturally closer than ever, continue to be dogged by lingering resentments and prejudices 
that have grown as first-hand memories of the conflict have faded. 
 
Alliance diplomacy also forms the core of Zhihua Shen’s chapter. Shen examines the delicate 
triangular relationship that existed between the three Communist powers – the Soviet Union, 
China and North Korea – during the opening months of the Korean War. At the heart of his 
study are the controversial behind-the-scenes negotiations between Joseph Stalin, Mao 
Zedong and Kim Il Sung, leading up to Chinese intervention in Korea in October 1950. Using 
a range of new Soviet and Chinese records, Shen demonstrates that a constant feature of these 
discussions was whether Moscow would provide air cover for a Chinese invasion. While 
North Korea was enjoying successes on the battlefield Stalin encouraged Mao in his 
preparations to deploy forces to Korea, vaguely promising the use of the Soviet Air Force. 
However, the Soviet leader was hopeful that a quick victory would nullify this commitment. 
But from late August 1950 military fortunes shifted in favour of the U.N.C. and Kim called 
for greater materiel support from both Moscow and Beijing. Following the Inchon landings in 
mid-September Mao finally lost patience and stepped up military planning, determined to 
prevent an American conquest of North Korea, forcing Stalin to ‘give the green light’ to 
Chinese intervention and putting pressure on him to provide Soviet air cover. 
Shen reveals that the following weeks witnessed a period of intense crisis within the 
Communist camp. Stalin vacillated, first agreeing to Mao’s demands but later informing 
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Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai that the Soviet Air Force was in no position to provide cover. 
Shen claims that Stalin, in fact, feared being sucked into direct conflict with the United 
States; was wary of Mao’s intentions and China’s future regional influence; hoped for a 
peaceful settlement through secret diplomatic channels at the U.N.; and because he was 
unsure if the U.S./U.N. advance could be halted even if China intervened. The author is 
deeply critical of Stalin’s inconsistencies and reserves praise for Mao’s resolution in deciding 
to send Chinese forces into Korea despite the lack of air cover. He stresses that this action 
proved crucial as once the Chinese had demonstrated their military effectiveness and anti-
American credentials Stalin did commit the Soviet Air Force in early November 1950 to 
protect the Yalu River border area. Shen states this action sealed the short-term future of the 
Sino-Soviet-North Korean alliance. In Shen’s view, nevertheless, China was left as the ‘main 
force of the alliance’ with Moscow thereafter generally supporting Beijing’s policies. 
 
Following on both thematically and chronologically from Shen, Robert Barnes examines the 
diplomatic crisis within the Western alliance that unfolded at the U.N. following Chinese 
intervention. As he rightly points out, ‘historians have lavished enormous attention’ on events 
during these months but they have failed to fully analyse the British Commonwealth’s 
challenge to U.S. hegemony at the U.N. that temporarily constrained the Truman 
administration’s plans to have China branded an aggressor and punished with sanctions. 
Referencing sources in American, British, Indian, Canadian, and Australian archival and 
private papers collections, Barnes argues that Commonwealth unity was essential to its 
success and explains that this occurred when four criteria were fulfilled: when the risk of a 
global conflict was at its greatest, when key Commonwealth personalities were prepared to 
exercise their influence in Washington, when coincidence brought the Commonwealth 
members together, and when the US government was willing to bow to Commonwealth 
pressure.  
Barnes’ article starts by outlining the nature of the Commonwealth prior to June 1950, 
stressing its loose organisation and the inherent divisions between the ‘Old Commonwealth’ 
nations (Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa), and the postcolonial 
‘New Commonwealth’ nations of India and Pakistan. Both groups had divergent national 
interests in the post-war world but Commonwealth membership remained an important aspect 
of each member’s foreign policy for a range of sentimental and practical reasons. Fissures 
within the Commonwealth, though, were nowhere more evident than at the U.N. where the 
‘Old’ members almost always bowed to U.S. dominance whereas India and, to a lesser extent, 
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Pakistan had positioned themselves within the neutral camp. Still, Barnes emphasises that the 
severity of the crisis following Chinese intervention created the conditions necessary for 
Commonwealth unity as its members feared that the policy pursued by Washington at the 
U.N. might escalate the conflict into a global war.  
Barnes then outlines the various attempts made by the Commonwealth to find a 
means to reach a negotiated settlement. He demonstrates that despite the deteriorating 
military situation the Commonwealth persuaded the United States to allow two UN attempts 
to broker an armistice: first, the creation of the Cease-Fire Committee that unsuccessfully 
sought to negotiate terms with Beijing; and second, the adoption by the General Assembly of 
a set of cease-fire ‘principles’. In both cases the Truman administration found the 
Commonwealth difficult to ignore because its members represented its key strategic partners 
in the Cold War as well as the leading Third World voice. But once the cease-fire ‘principles’ 
were rejected by the Chinese, under intense domestic pressure, Washington’s willingness to 
bow to allied opinion evaporated. As a result, Commonwealth unity shattered with only 
Britain and India remaining steadfast. Importantly, though, British intransigence did prove 
enough to win one last concession. The U.S. Government altered its resolution so that after 
China was branded an aggressor one further attempt would be made to find a cease-fire 
before sanctions were considered.  With their major aim achieved and with the military 
situation improving in late January 1951, all of the Commonwealth members except India 
now supported the U.S. resolution. Yet Barnes concludes that the Commonwealth challenge 
had sufficiently diluted American policy and delayed punitive action long enough so that the 
crisis had begun to pass and the risk of escalation had diminished. 
 
Colin Jackson takes up the story at this point but shifts attention to military policy in the 
spring of 1951. His chapter critiques the so-called ‘lessons’ of Korea which shaped 
Washington’s limited war strategy for much of the Cold War. Jackson does this be re-
examining the often ignored proposal by General James Van Fleet, Commander of the U.S. 
Eighth Army, in April 1951 for amphibious landings at Tongchon and an advance north to 
the narrow ‘neck’ of Korea stretching between Pyongyang and Wonsan. Basing his findings 
largely on new Soviet and Chinese evidence documenting cable traffic between Mao and 
Stalin, Jackson argues that Operation ‘Detonate’ was feasible on ‘purely military grounds’. 
He states that the Communist forces had exhausted themselves during their failed Spring 
Offensives whereas the U.N.C. enjoyed considerable firepower, mobility, and logistics 
advantages. The author thus contends that this episode represented a ‘lost chance’ to greatly 
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weaken the enemy, place the U.N.C. in a much stronger negotiating position once armistice 
talks began, bring about a precipitate and satisfactory end to the conflict, weaken North 
Korea and strengthen the R.O.K., deter the Communists from future aggression, and 
undermine the Sino-Soviet alliance. Moreover, he claims there was little risk of escalation 
since Stalin was unlikely to commit Soviet forces to prevent such a limited advance. 
Jackson, therefore, is extremely critical of U.N. Commander General Matthew 
Ridgway and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for rejecting Van Fleet’s proposal. He dismisses the 
arguments presented by these figures after 1953 in which they claimed Operation ‘Detonate’ 
would have been too costly, risked Soviet intervention, and only have gained territory that 
would have been later conceded during the armistice negotiations. Instead, Jackson believes 
their decision was political in nature. He claims Ridgway and the Joint Chiefs were especially 
cautious because of the domestic crisis revolving around MacArthur’s recent dismissal and 
the concurrent Senate Hearings. The Joint Chiefs were also aware of the NATO allies’ 
opposition to taking any new initiative in Korea and their desire to conserve military 
resources for Europe. Additionally, Jackson believes Ridgway conflated Van Fleet’s limited 
proposals with the various measures championed by MacArthur before his dismissal that 
would have in all likelihood escalated the conflict. In conclusion, the author is quick to point 
out that even Ridgway realised his error afterwards when, only a month later, he reconsidered 
the idea of an amphibious landing to break the military stalemate. 
 
In his chapter Steven Casey examines a very different aspect of the American experience 
during the Korean War. He questions how the U.S. public perceives the human cost of war – 
in terms of American battlefield deaths – and challenges John Mueller’s widely influential 
‘simple association: as casualties mount, support decreases’. Casey argues that this 
formulation underestimates the reporting techniques used by the military and government to 
manage public opinion and fails to consider the role of political elites – namely the media and 
Congress – in scrutinising the official narrative. Taking these factors into account, Casey 
emphasises that casualty reporting is not automatic and the public gains only a limited 
knowledge of the true costs of war. To demonstrate his argument, the author first traces the 
evolution of casual reporting during the two world wars. He then concentrates on the Korean 
War, which he claims drew from these past examples but also set many new precedents for 
the limited wars fought by the United States during the Cold War.  
The research questions at the heart of Casey’s study are: how did the U.S. military 
publicise casualties in the midst of ongoing battles; what difficulties did they encounter; what 
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efforts were made by the military to manage the public’s reaction; how did the media and 
Congress, in turn, use these figures to influence opinion; and whether any of these actions 
actually had an impact on public perception of the conflict in Korea. He concludes that during 
the first six months of the war, when the fighting was extremely fluid, the previously 
established theories of casualty reporting were made exceedingly difficult. The military thus 
struggled to produce accurate figures and keep a close rein on the release of this information. 
Casey is especially critical of U.N. Commander General Douglas MacArthur for allowing the 
press present in Korea too much freedom of movement, imposing no form of censorship, and 
for trying to minimise U.N., and maximise enemy, casualty figures for his own ends. These 
failings created discrepancies between the official figures released to the public and those 
reported by the press. Many newspapers and the Republican Right then used the often 
inaccurate and exaggerated casualty figures coming from journalists in Korea as part of their 
campaign against the Truman administration. Casey firmly believes that these high casualty 
figures were definitely a contributing factor in the dip in popularity of the conflict in January 
1951 following China’s intervention. 
Nevertheless, Casey is quick to point out that in the spring of 1951 the U.N.C. 
imposed limited censorship and restricted the movement of journalists in an effort to regain 
control over casualty reporting. These measures were made easier as the military situation 
solidified. Consequently, for over a year the authorities appeared to be in control of the flow 
of information, the media and Congress appeared to be relatively compliant, and public 
support for the war remained steady. Even so, Casey stresses that General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower in his presidential campaign in 1952 referred regularly to high numbers of 
casualties to successfully drum up support against the Truman administration’s limited war 
strategy in Korea. Based on the experiences of the winter of 1950-1951 and October 1952 the 
author writes, ‘In short, casualties are clearly important. But the specific impact they have on 
the home front depends on the complex interplay between the military’s casualty reporting on 
the one hand and elite efforts to question the official narrative on the other’.  
 
 
Finally, Charles Young’s chapter covers the conclusion of the Korean War and its aftermath, 
tackling the theme of memory alluded to at the start of this introduction. Young begins by 
stressing that despite the rehabilitation of the importance of the Korean War in recent decades 
within academia, the conflict’s ‘forgottenness’ remains the norm throughout American 
society as a whole. He states that compared to the two World Wars, that both ended in 
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resounding victories, and the Vietnam War, that ended in a humiliating defeat, there have 
been relatively few memorials built or references made in popular culture to the Korean War. 
Young goes on to explain in detail why, in his view, this is the case. He stresses that this lack 
of memory stems principally from the conflict’s inconclusive end result but also from a 
number of other aspects of the conflict that he sees as anathema to the American public: its 
limited nature, the lack of clear war aims, the military stalemate, the prolonged armistice 
negotiations, the media’s disinterest after the first year, and Congressional dissent from both 
the Right and Left. Young highlights that while the United States had achieved its principle 
goal of containment, President Eisenhower in July 1953 could hardly have claimed a victory 
after three years of bitter fighting that left the peninsula divided along almost the same line as 
it had been in June 1950.  
The author believes, nevertheless, that the prisoner-of-war question offered an 
opportunity to forge a more positive memory of Korea that was not taken. The war had been 
prolonged by eighteen months precisely because at the armistice talks the U.S. negotiators 
representing the U.N. argued for the principle of ‘voluntary repatriation’, stating that 
prisoners should not be forced to return to their homelands against their will. The fact that the 
enemy eventually accepted these demands was, Young writes, ‘a significant concession from 
the Communists that national security leaders might have raised high on a banner’ since this 
was ‘an epic humiliation: tens-of-thousands of salt-of-the-earth peasant soldiers...turning 
away from Marxism’. Borrowing from the title of a book by Rosemary Foot, Young thus 
argues that voluntary repatriation presented ‘a substitute for victory’4. Nonetheless, despite 
its obsession with propaganda and the ideological nature of the Cold War, the U.S. 
Government failed to take advantage of this development. Young blames the fact that 
voluntary repatriation remained a ‘public secret’ during and after the termination of the 
armistice negotiations. He is critical, therefore, of the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations for never making voluntary repatriation a war aim. Young claims both 
Presidents feared that support for continuation of the war would collapse if the public felt 
American soldiers were being killed in exchange for the freedom of Chinese and Korean ex-
Communists. 
 
Evidently, each of the chapters covered in this collection provides an exciting new outlook on 
the Korean War. Yet they are all part of various traditions and current debates circulating 
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within the historiography of the conflict. To start, Stueck and Yi contribute significantly to 
the considerable body of literature on the origins of war, particularly those works that have 
examined the U.S. occupation of the southern part of the peninsula. Considerable 
disagreement has arisen on this issue over whether the USAMGIK should be assigned 
responsibility for the civil strife that led to the outbreak of fighting in 1950. Donald Boose, 
Choi Sang-Yong, Bruce Cumings, Jeon Sang-Sook, James Matray, as well as Stueck in an 
earlier work, have all argued that the US Army’s miscalculations in working with Japanese 
authorities and the conservative elite while ignoring the Left, as well as the hasty end of the 
US occupation, left South Korea without a strong civil administration, creating conditions 
that led to the Korean War5. In contrast, Gregg Brazinsky, Donald Macdonald, Allan Millett, 
and Park Chan-Pyo, while acknowledging mistakes were made, have defended the 
USAMGIK’s record. They stress that policies implemented during the occupation helped 
revive the South Korean economy, created an administrative infrastructure, instituted 
democracy, promoted land reform, and established a fledgling military6. 
Shen adds to the debate concerning China's decision to intervene in the Korean War 
that has received a thorough re-examination in recent years as Soviet and Chinese records 
have become more readily available. The traditional argument, first put forward by Allen 
Whiting and later repeated by Russell Spurr and Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, claims that Mao 
sent forces to Korea because the U.N.C. advance to the Yalu constituted a grave threat to 
China’s national security7. However, Chen Jian and Zhang Shu Guang have recently 
contended that Beijing intervened for a range of other reasons: to restore China's Great Power 
status; promote the Communist revolution at home and abroad; and repay a debt to North 
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Korea for the soldiers it had sent to fight in the Chinese Civil War. Moreover, both historians 
state that Mao was confident that his guerrilla tactics and the fighting spirit of the ordinary 
Chinese soldier could inflict a defeat upon the United States and China could withstand 
atomic attacks8. Furthermore, Shen’s work builds on the research examining the difficulties 
experienced within the Communist camp during the Korean War, such as those by Sergei 
Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, Alexandre Mansourov and Robert Simmons9. 
Barnes’ chapter is closely related to three categories of study: international histories 
of the Korean War, national histories of the role played by individual Commonwealth 
countries in the conflict, and histories of the U.N.’s involvement. In terms of the first 
category, William Stueck has produced by far the most considered analysis of alliance 
diplomacy, paying particular interest to relations between the United States and its allies at 
the U.N. and beyond10. With regards to Commonwealth countries, the role of Britain has 
received considerable attention from Michael Dockrill, Anthony Farrar-Hockley, Rosemary 
Foot, Michael Hopkins, Peter Lowe and Callum MacDonald11. Two excellent national 
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histories of Canada’s experiences have been written by Denis Stairs and John Melady12. On 
Australia, Gavan McCormack and Robert O’Neill have provided the best contributions13. Ian 
McGibbon has written the only history of New Zealand in the Korean War14. And the best 
account of India’s role remains Shiv Dayal’s now dated book15. Graeme Mount has also 
considered relations between certain ‘Old’ Commonwealth countries and the United States 
during the conflict16. Finally, Barnes’ research relates to the works of Tae-Ho Yoo and 
Leland Goodrich who have both examined the U.N.’s role during the Korean War17. 
Jackson builds upon the vast array of literature covering military aspects of the 
conflict. A large number of excellent official and unofficial histories have been written 
concerning the experiences of the various forces that were involved in Korea18. While these 
works are too numerous to consider at length here, it is important to point out that very few 
historians have challenged the orthodox view that by the late spring of 1951 relative parity 
existed, making any thought of taking the military initiative unrealistic and risky. Van Fleet’s 
proposal for an amphibious landing at Tongchon and a limited advance to the Pyongyang-
Wonsan line has thus been largely overlooked except by military historians such as Donald 
Boose and Allan Millett. These two authors at least partially agree with Jackson’s analysis 
that this represented a ‘lost chance’ from a military standpoint although they are less critical 
of Ridgway and the Joint Chiefs given the difficult political situation at the time19. 
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Casey’s chapter provides a significant contribution to the small but growing body of 
literature assessing the Korean War's impact on U.S. domestic affairs. Casey himself has 
been the most prolific writer in this area in recent years, having published a book and a 
number articles revolving around the ways the Truman and Eisenhower administration’s 
attempted to ‘sell’ the Korean War to the American public and the government’s relationship 
with the political elite20. Still, Ronald Caridi, Robert Ivie, Paul Pierpaoli and John Wiltz have 
all addressed related issues 21. Casey’s work is also directly connected to the considerable 
research into the internal workings of the U.S. Government during the Korean War. The best 
examples of this genre are the studies written by Foot and Burton Kaufman22. 
Young’s work is also directly connected to the historiography focusing on the 
influence of the Korean War on U.S. domestic affairs. But as well as this Young makes an 
invaluable contribution to the body of work on the Korean armistice negotiations, in 
particular those books centred on the prisoner-of-war question. For a number of decades most 
historians argued that the motivation behind the inflexible refusal of the United States to 
return communist POWs to China and North Korea against their will was humanitarian, 
endorsing Truman's own explanation for his policy23. In recent years, however, Sydney 
Bailey, Barton Bernstein and Foot have insisted that the central factor in Truman’s thinking 
was to win a propaganda victory in the Cold War. Moreover, these authors have doubted the 
legality of voluntary repatriation and been deeply critical of the U.N.C.’s use of Chinese 
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Nationalist and South Korean guards and agents in the U.N. prisoner camps who used 
coercion and violence to force prisoners to refuse repatriation24. 
 
On first impressions this collection of essays on the Korean War might appear to be rather 
eclectic. While it is certainly the case that the topics covered are diverse, on closer inspection, 
there are a number of themes that resonate throughout. Each of the chapters has a distinct 
geographical focus, be it the United States, its closest allies, or the three Communist countries 
involved in Korea. The authors also share an interest in a number of largely ignored themes: 
alliance diplomacy, military policy, U.S. domestic affairs, and memory. In addition, while 
these chapters all draw on existing trends in the literature written on this conflict, they each 
make original and thought-provoking contributions of their own. The issues raised in these 
pages, therefore, have opened up new avenues of research. Clearly there remain many 
‘unknown’ aspects of the Korean War for future generations of historians to uncover. 
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